Publications
2022 |
Chen, Z; Sinclair, AJ; Ma, C Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why China Developed Financial Markets So Late Journal Article The Economic Journal, 2022, ISSN: 0013-0133. @article{HKUHUB_10722_305189, title = {Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why China Developed Financial Markets So Late}, author = {Z Chen and AJ Sinclair and C Ma}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/305189}, doi = {10.1093/ej/ueab082}, issn = {0013-0133}, year = {2022}, date = {2022-01-01}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, abstract = {Over the past millennium, China has relied on the Confucian clan to achieve interpersonal cooperation, focusing on kinship and neglecting the development of impersonal institutions needed for external finance. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the Confucian clan and financial markets are competing substitutes. Using the large cross-regional variation in the adoption of modern banks, we find that regions with historically stronger Confucian clans established significantly fewer modern banks in the four decades following the founding of China's first modern bank in 1897. Our evidence also shows that the clan continues to limit China's financial development today.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Over the past millennium, China has relied on the Confucian clan to achieve interpersonal cooperation, focusing on kinship and neglecting the development of impersonal institutions needed for external finance. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the Confucian clan and financial markets are competing substitutes. Using the large cross-regional variation in the adoption of modern banks, we find that regions with historically stronger Confucian clans established significantly fewer modern banks in the four decades following the founding of China's first modern bank in 1897. Our evidence also shows that the clan continues to limit China's financial development today. |
2021 |
Sinclair, AJ; Ma, C; Chen, Z Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why China Developed Financial Markets So Late Conference 2021. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_312833, title = {Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why China Developed Financial Markets So Late}, author = {AJ Sinclair and C Ma and Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/312833}, year = {2021}, date = {2021-01-01}, journal = {Humboldt University of Berlin Finance Seminar Series}, abstract = {What made finance develop in the West but not in China? We argue that long before modern finance, China chose to rely on the kinship-based Confucian clan, whereas the West chose the corporate entity combined with impersonal instruments, to deal with the challenges of interpersonal risk sharing and resource pooling. That difference in choice led to two distinct institutional-development paths. Pre-modern China was ordered hierarchically around patrilineal clans that each served as an informal internal financial market for members, where intra-clan pooling and sharing obligations were rigidly enforced through Confucian rules and rituals. For more than two millennia, institutional innovations focused almost exclusively on solidifying the clan system to minimise the uncertainty and transaction costs of implicit intra-clan exchange. By the early nineteenth century, the clan as an internal financial market and as a business corporation served China well. However, it came at the cost of ignoring the development of the impersonal institutions needed for formal finance. Even when formal finance was transplanted in the late nineteenth century, its adoption was not smooth. We provide empirical evidence that the Confucian clan competed with and indeed inhibited the development of modern banking in the early twentieth century, and that Confucianism continues to limit finance in contemporary China.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } What made finance develop in the West but not in China? We argue that long before modern finance, China chose to rely on the kinship-based Confucian clan, whereas the West chose the corporate entity combined with impersonal instruments, to deal with the challenges of interpersonal risk sharing and resource pooling. That difference in choice led to two distinct institutional-development paths. Pre-modern China was ordered hierarchically around patrilineal clans that each served as an informal internal financial market for members, where intra-clan pooling and sharing obligations were rigidly enforced through Confucian rules and rituals. For more than two millennia, institutional innovations focused almost exclusively on solidifying the clan system to minimise the uncertainty and transaction costs of implicit intra-clan exchange. By the early nineteenth century, the clan as an internal financial market and as a business corporation served China well. However, it came at the cost of ignoring the development of the impersonal institutions needed for formal finance. Even when formal finance was transplanted in the late nineteenth century, its adoption was not smooth. We provide empirical evidence that the Confucian clan competed with and indeed inhibited the development of modern banking in the early twentieth century, and that Confucianism continues to limit finance in contemporary China. |
2020 |
Chen, Z Ancient roots of financial and social divergence between China and the West Conference 2020. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_312450, title = {Ancient roots of financial and social divergence between China and the West}, author = {Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/312450}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, journal = {Sociological Forum (Fall 2020-2021)}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
Chen, Z Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why Did China Miss the Financial Revolution? Conference 2020. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_312454, title = {Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why Did China Miss the Financial Revolution?}, author = {Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/312454}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, journal = {Princeton Finance Group Webinar Series}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
Sinclair, AJ; Ma, C; Chen, Z Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why Did China Miss the Financial Revolution? Conference 2020. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_290755, title = {Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why Did China Miss the Financial Revolution?}, author = {AJ Sinclair and C Ma and Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/290755}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, journal = {European Economic Association Annual Congress}, abstract = {What made finance develop in the West but not in China? We argue that long before modern finance, China chose to rely on the kinship-based Confucian clan, whereas the West chose the corporate entity combined with impersonal instruments, to deal with the challenges of interpersonal risk sharing and resource pooling. That difference in choice led to two distinct institutional-development paths. Pre-modern China was ordered hierarchically around patrilineal clans that each served as an informal internal financial market for members, where intra-clan pooling and sharing obligations were rigidly enforced through Confucian rules and rituals. For more than two millennia, institutional innovations focused almost exclusively on solidifying the clan system to minimise the uncertainty and transaction costs of implicit intra-clan exchange. By the early nineteenth century, the clan as an internal financial market and as a business corporation served China well. However, it came at the cost of ignoring the development of the impersonal institutions needed for formal finance. Even when formal finance was transplanted in the late nineteenth century, its adoption was not smooth. We provide empirical evidence that the Confucian clan competed with and indeed inhibited the development of modern banking in the early twentieth century, and that Confucianism continues to limit finance in contemporary China.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } What made finance develop in the West but not in China? We argue that long before modern finance, China chose to rely on the kinship-based Confucian clan, whereas the West chose the corporate entity combined with impersonal instruments, to deal with the challenges of interpersonal risk sharing and resource pooling. That difference in choice led to two distinct institutional-development paths. Pre-modern China was ordered hierarchically around patrilineal clans that each served as an informal internal financial market for members, where intra-clan pooling and sharing obligations were rigidly enforced through Confucian rules and rituals. For more than two millennia, institutional innovations focused almost exclusively on solidifying the clan system to minimise the uncertainty and transaction costs of implicit intra-clan exchange. By the early nineteenth century, the clan as an internal financial market and as a business corporation served China well. However, it came at the cost of ignoring the development of the impersonal institutions needed for formal finance. Even when formal finance was transplanted in the late nineteenth century, its adoption was not smooth. We provide empirical evidence that the Confucian clan competed with and indeed inhibited the development of modern banking in the early twentieth century, and that Confucianism continues to limit finance in contemporary China. |
Chen, Z Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why did China miss the Financial Revolution? Conference 2020. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_312451, title = {Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why did China miss the Financial Revolution?}, author = {Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/312451}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-01-01}, journal = {The Nineteenth Annual Conference of Association for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Culture (ASREC) 2020 24 Hour Virtual Conference}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
2018 |
Chen, Z A historical study of violence Conference 2018. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_265808, title = {A historical study of violence}, author = {Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/265808}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, journal = {The 6th Summer School for Quantitative History}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
Chen, Z A Study of Wife Prices in Qing China: How women were used as Insurance Assets Conference 2018. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_263730, title = {A Study of Wife Prices in Qing China: How women were used as Insurance Assets}, author = {Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/263730}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, journal = {The 6th Summer School for Quantitative History}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
Chen, Z Assessing China’s economic policies Conference 2018. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_268773, title = {Assessing China’s economic policies}, author = {Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/268773}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, journal = {The 6th Growth Net Summit, New Delhi, India}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
Yun, Y; Chen, Z; Lin, Z Asset Portfolios of Elite Households in Qing China: A Study Based on Historical Property-confiscation Archives Journal Article 金融研究 = Journal of Financial Research, 2018, ISSN: 1002-7246. @article{HKUHUB_10722_263818, title = {Asset Portfolios of Elite Households in Qing China: A Study Based on Historical Property-confiscation Archives}, author = {Y Yun and Z Chen and Z Lin}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/263818}, issn = {1002-7246}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-01-01}, journal = {金融研究 = Journal of Financial Research}, abstract = {本文以清宫所藏奏折与内务府档案中所包含的大量获罪官员的抄家记录为基础,系统估算清代官绅家庭的资产结构。过去对传统社会精英阶层家庭财产和收入的理解,以田地、房屋首当其冲,偶或涉及借贷资本,但是对各自比重一直没有明确数字。我们先设计一套可以与现代家庭资产统计方式接轨的分类框架,然后介绍对家产各项内容的估价方法,并举案例说明。最后通过对185个官绅家产案例进行统计和分析,发现这些案例在金融商业类资产项下有不低的比重,同时,金玉铜磁、绸缎皮衣等各种实物也占据了相当的份额。作为传统资产形式的田房不动产一方面是投资置业首选,但另一方面当财富积累到一定水平后比重不断下降,以致在社会财富阶梯顶端已不具明显优势。}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } 本文以清宫所藏奏折与内务府档案中所包含的大量获罪官员的抄家记录为基础,系统估算清代官绅家庭的资产结构。过去对传统社会精英阶层家庭财产和收入的理解,以田地、房屋首当其冲,偶或涉及借贷资本,但是对各自比重一直没有明确数字。我们先设计一套可以与现代家庭资产统计方式接轨的分类框架,然后介绍对家产各项内容的估价方法,并举案例说明。最后通过对185个官绅家产案例进行统计和分析,发现这些案例在金融商业类资产项下有不低的比重,同时,金玉铜磁、绸缎皮衣等各种实物也占据了相当的份额。作为传统资产形式的田房不动产一方面是投资置业首选,但另一方面当财富积累到一定水平后比重不断下降,以致在社会财富阶梯顶端已不具明显优势。 |
2017 |
Chen, Z A Study of Wife Prices in Qing China: How women were used as Insurance Assets Conference 2017. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_265921, title = {A Study of Wife Prices in Qing China: How women were used as Insurance Assets}, author = {Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/265921}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, journal = {The 5th Summer School for Quantitative History, and the 5th International Symposium on Quantitative History}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
Chen, H; Suen, WC Aspiring for Change: A Theory of Middle Class Activism Journal Article The Economic Journal, 2017, ISSN: 0013-0133. @article{HKUHUB_10722_229651, title = {Aspiring for Change: A Theory of Middle Class Activism}, author = {H Chen and WC Suen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/229651}, doi = {10.1111/ecoj.12346}, issn = {0013-0133}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, abstract = {We propose a regime change model in which people are uncertain about both the quality of a specific regime and governance in general. The poor perceive the current regime as bad, rationally infer that all governments are bad, and therefore believe mass movements are futile. The middle class are more sanguine about the prospect of good government, and believe that collective action is effective because they expect many fellow citizens to share the same view. This coordination game with incomplete information does not admit monotone equilibrium but exhibits multiple interval equilibria, where middle class people are more likely to attack the regime.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } We propose a regime change model in which people are uncertain about both the quality of a specific regime and governance in general. The poor perceive the current regime as bad, rationally infer that all governments are bad, and therefore believe mass movements are futile. The middle class are more sanguine about the prospect of good government, and believe that collective action is effective because they expect many fellow citizens to share the same view. This coordination game with incomplete information does not admit monotone equilibrium but exhibits multiple interval equilibria, where middle class people are more likely to attack the regime. |
Suen, WC; Chen, H Aspiring for Change: A Theory of Middle Class Activism Journal Article The Economic Journal, 2017, ISSN: 0013-0133. @article{HKUHUB_10722_229651b, title = {Aspiring for Change: A Theory of Middle Class Activism}, author = {WC Suen and H Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/229651}, doi = {10.1111/ecoj.12346}, issn = {0013-0133}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, abstract = {We propose a regime change model in which people are uncertain about both the quality of a specific regime and governance in general. The poor perceive the current regime as bad, rationally infer that all governments are bad, and therefore believe mass movements are futile. The middle class are more sanguine about the prospect of good government, and believe that collective action is effective because they expect many fellow citizens to share the same view. This coordination game with incomplete information does not admit monotone equilibrium but exhibits multiple interval equilibria, where middle class people are more likely to attack the regime.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } We propose a regime change model in which people are uncertain about both the quality of a specific regime and governance in general. The poor perceive the current regime as bad, rationally infer that all governments are bad, and therefore believe mass movements are futile. The middle class are more sanguine about the prospect of good government, and believe that collective action is effective because they expect many fellow citizens to share the same view. This coordination game with incomplete information does not admit monotone equilibrium but exhibits multiple interval equilibria, where middle class people are more likely to attack the regime. |
Suen, WC; Chen, H Aspiring for Change: A Theory of Middle Class Activism Journal Article The Economic Journal, 2017, ISSN: 0013-0133. @article{HKUHUB_10722_229651c, title = {Aspiring for Change: A Theory of Middle Class Activism}, author = {WC Suen and H Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/229651}, doi = {10.1111/ecoj.12346}, issn = {0013-0133}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, abstract = {We propose a regime change model in which people are uncertain about both the quality of a specific regime and governance in general. The poor perceive the current regime as bad, rationally infer that all governments are bad, and therefore believe mass movements are futile. The middle class are more sanguine about the prospect of good government, and believe that collective action is effective because they expect many fellow citizens to share the same view. This coordination game with incomplete information does not admit monotone equilibrium but exhibits multiple interval equilibria, where middle class people are more likely to attack the regime.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } We propose a regime change model in which people are uncertain about both the quality of a specific regime and governance in general. The poor perceive the current regime as bad, rationally infer that all governments are bad, and therefore believe mass movements are futile. The middle class are more sanguine about the prospect of good government, and believe that collective action is effective because they expect many fellow citizens to share the same view. This coordination game with incomplete information does not admit monotone equilibrium but exhibits multiple interval equilibria, where middle class people are more likely to attack the regime. |
2012 |
Lu, Y; Du, J; Tao, Z Bank loans vs. Trade credit;Evidence from China Journal Article Economics of Transition, 2012, ISSN: 0967-0750. @article{HKUHUB_10722_178090, title = {Bank loans vs. Trade credit;Evidence from China}, author = {Y Lu and J Du and Z Tao}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/178090}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0351.2012.00439.x}, issn = {0967-0750}, year = {2012}, date = {2012-01-01}, journal = {Economics of Transition}, abstract = {Using a World Bank dataset of Chinese firms, we investigate the relative importance of bank loans and trade credit in promoting firm performance. To deal with possible endogeneity issues, we employ distinct and separable instrumental variables for bank loans and trade credit. We find that access to bank loans is central to improving firm performance and growth, while the availability of trade credit is much less important. Our results suggest that trade credit cannot effectively substitute for bank loans. Overall, our findings suggest the need for further development of China's formal financial institutions, which would enable the non-state sector to grow much faster than it has grown in recent decades. © 2012 The Authors.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Using a World Bank dataset of Chinese firms, we investigate the relative importance of bank loans and trade credit in promoting firm performance. To deal with possible endogeneity issues, we employ distinct and separable instrumental variables for bank loans and trade credit. We find that access to bank loans is central to improving firm performance and growth, while the availability of trade credit is much less important. Our results suggest that trade credit cannot effectively substitute for bank loans. Overall, our findings suggest the need for further development of China's formal financial institutions, which would enable the non-state sector to grow much faster than it has grown in recent decades. © 2012 The Authors. |
2011 |
Han, J; Suen, W Age structure of the workforce in growing and declining industries: Evidence from Hong Kong Journal Article Journal of Population Economics, 2011, ISSN: 0933-1433. @article{HKUHUB_10722_139815, title = {Age structure of the workforce in growing and declining industries: Evidence from Hong Kong}, author = {J Han and W Suen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/139815}, doi = {10.1007/s00148-009-0291-2}, issn = {0933-1433}, year = {2011}, date = {2011-01-01}, journal = {Journal of Population Economics}, abstract = {Industry-specific human capital reduces the incentive for older workers to leave declining industries and raises the incentive for younger workers to join growing industries. Using the industry restructuring experience of Hong Kong, we find that a 1% increase in employment share of an industry is associated with a 0. 60-year decrease in the average age of its workforce. The relationship is more pronounced among less educated workers, who have less general human capital, and male workers, who are more committed to the labor force, than among well educated workers and female workers. © 2009 Springer-Verlag.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Industry-specific human capital reduces the incentive for older workers to leave declining industries and raises the incentive for younger workers to join growing industries. Using the industry restructuring experience of Hong Kong, we find that a 1% increase in employment share of an industry is associated with a 0. 60-year decrease in the average age of its workforce. The relationship is more pronounced among less educated workers, who have less general human capital, and male workers, who are more committed to the labor force, than among well educated workers and female workers. © 2009 Springer-Verlag. |
Han, J; Suen, W Age structure of the workforce in growing and declining industries: Evidence from Hong Kong Journal Article Journal of Population Economics, 2011, ISSN: 0933-1433. @article{HKUHUB_10722_139815b, title = {Age structure of the workforce in growing and declining industries: Evidence from Hong Kong}, author = {J Han and W Suen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/139815}, doi = {10.1007/s00148-009-0291-2}, issn = {0933-1433}, year = {2011}, date = {2011-01-01}, journal = {Journal of Population Economics}, abstract = {Industry-specific human capital reduces the incentive for older workers to leave declining industries and raises the incentive for younger workers to join growing industries. Using the industry restructuring experience of Hong Kong, we find that a 1% increase in employment share of an industry is associated with a 0. 60-year decrease in the average age of its workforce. The relationship is more pronounced among less educated workers, who have less general human capital, and male workers, who are more committed to the labor force, than among well educated workers and female workers. © 2009 Springer-Verlag.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Industry-specific human capital reduces the incentive for older workers to leave declining industries and raises the incentive for younger workers to join growing industries. Using the industry restructuring experience of Hong Kong, we find that a 1% increase in employment share of an industry is associated with a 0. 60-year decrease in the average age of its workforce. The relationship is more pronounced among less educated workers, who have less general human capital, and male workers, who are more committed to the labor force, than among well educated workers and female workers. © 2009 Springer-Verlag. |
2010 |
Jindra, JAN; Chen, Z A valuation study of stock market seasonality and the size effect Journal Article Journal of Portfolio Management, 2010, ISSN: 0095-4918. @article{HKUHUB_10722_222284, title = {A valuation study of stock market seasonality and the size effect}, author = {JAN Jindra and Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/222284}, doi = {10.3905/JPM.2010.36.3.078}, issn = {0095-4918}, year = {2010}, date = {2010-01-01}, journal = {Journal of Portfolio Management}, abstract = {Existing studies on market seasonality and the size effect are largely based on realized returns. In this article, Chen and Jindra investigate seasonal variations and size-related differences in a cross-stock valuation distribution.They use three stock valuation measures, two derived from structural models and one from the book-to-market ratio. The authors find that the average valuation level is highest in mid-summer and lowest in mid-December. Furthermore, the valuation dispersion (kurtosis) across stocks increases toward year-end and reverses direction after the turn of the year, suggesting increased movements in both the underand overvaluation directions. Among size groups, small-cap stocks exhibit the sharpest decline in valuation from June to December and the highest rise from December to January. For most months, small-cap stocks have the lowest valuation among all size groups and show the widest cross-stock valuation dispersion, meaning that they are also the hardest to value. Overall, large-cap stocks enjoy the highest valuation uniformity and are the least subject to valuation seasonality.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Existing studies on market seasonality and the size effect are largely based on realized returns. In this article, Chen and Jindra investigate seasonal variations and size-related differences in a cross-stock valuation distribution.They use three stock valuation measures, two derived from structural models and one from the book-to-market ratio. The authors find that the average valuation level is highest in mid-summer and lowest in mid-December. Furthermore, the valuation dispersion (kurtosis) across stocks increases toward year-end and reverses direction after the turn of the year, suggesting increased movements in both the underand overvaluation directions. Among size groups, small-cap stocks exhibit the sharpest decline in valuation from June to December and the highest rise from December to January. For most months, small-cap stocks have the lowest valuation among all size groups and show the widest cross-stock valuation dispersion, meaning that they are also the hardest to value. Overall, large-cap stocks enjoy the highest valuation uniformity and are the least subject to valuation seasonality. |
2009 |
Lu, Y; Du, J; Tao, Z Bi-sourcing in the global economy Journal Article Journal of International Economics, 2009, ISSN: 0022-1996. @article{HKUHUB_10722_60219, title = {Bi-sourcing in the global economy}, author = {Y Lu and J Du and Z Tao}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/60219}, doi = {10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.01.005}, issn = {0022-1996}, year = {2009}, date = {2009-01-01}, journal = {Journal of International Economics}, abstract = {In organizing production, many firms conduct bi-sourcing, i.e., acquiring the same set of inputs both by buying from external suppliers (outsourcing) and carrying out in-house production (insourcing). We show that, by adopting the bi-sourcing strategy, firms can use the payoff from one supplier as a backup option in negotiating with the other supplier (the cross-threat effect). When firms conduct bi-sourcing in the global economy consisting of the high-waged North and low-waged South, they need to make the location choice for both insourcing and outsourcing. We find that the low wage in the South can encourage investment by component suppliers (the cost effect). However, firms may achieve a better cross-threat effect by relocating overly strong component supplier from the cost-advantageous South to the cost-disadvantageous North (the balancing effect). The optimal bi-sourcing strategy is determined by the interplay of the cost effect and the balancing effect. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } In organizing production, many firms conduct bi-sourcing, i.e., acquiring the same set of inputs both by buying from external suppliers (outsourcing) and carrying out in-house production (insourcing). We show that, by adopting the bi-sourcing strategy, firms can use the payoff from one supplier as a backup option in negotiating with the other supplier (the cross-threat effect). When firms conduct bi-sourcing in the global economy consisting of the high-waged North and low-waged South, they need to make the location choice for both insourcing and outsourcing. We find that the low wage in the South can encourage investment by component suppliers (the cost effect). However, firms may achieve a better cross-threat effect by relocating overly strong component supplier from the cost-advantageous South to the cost-disadvantageous North (the balancing effect). The optimal bi-sourcing strategy is determined by the interplay of the cost effect and the balancing effect. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
2008 |
Chan, J; Suen, W A spatial theory of news consumption and electoral competition Journal Article Review of Economic Studies, 2008, ISSN: 0034-6527. @article{HKUHUB_10722_60179, title = {A spatial theory of news consumption and electoral competition}, author = {J Chan and W Suen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/60179}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00495.x}, issn = {0034-6527}, year = {2008}, date = {2008-01-01}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, abstract = {We characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies. Political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news. When there are two media outlets, each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views. Voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly. Two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones, but voter welfare is not always higher. © 2008 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } We characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies. Political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news. When there are two media outlets, each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views. Voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly. Two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones, but voter welfare is not always higher. © 2008 The Review of Economic Studies Limited. |
Chan, J; Suen, W A spatial theory of news consumption and electoral competition Journal Article Review of Economic Studies, 2008, ISSN: 0034-6527. @article{HKUHUB_10722_60179b, title = {A spatial theory of news consumption and electoral competition}, author = {J Chan and W Suen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/60179}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00495.x}, issn = {0034-6527}, year = {2008}, date = {2008-01-01}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, abstract = {We characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies. Political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news. When there are two media outlets, each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views. Voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly. Two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones, but voter welfare is not always higher. © 2008 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } We characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies. Political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news. When there are two media outlets, each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views. Voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly. Two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones, but voter welfare is not always higher. © 2008 The Review of Economic Studies Limited. |
2006 |
Tao, Z; Du, J; Lu, Y Bi-sourcing in the Global Economy Conference 2006. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_112187, title = {Bi-sourcing in the Global Economy}, author = {Z Tao and J Du and Y Lu}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/112187}, year = {2006}, date = {2006-01-01}, journal = {Midwest Theory and International Trade Meeting}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
2005 |
Chen, Z A free press could help China's economy Journal Article Financial Times (London, 1888), 2005, ISSN: 0307-1766. @article{HKUHUB_10722_222288, title = {A free press could help China's economy}, author = {Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/222288}, issn = {0307-1766}, year = {2005}, date = {2005-01-01}, journal = {Financial Times (London, 1888)}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } |
Tao, Z; Lu, J; Bai, C An empirical study on the access to bank loans by private enterprises in China Journal Article China Economic Quarterly, 2005. @article{HKUHUB_10722_85925, title = {An empirical study on the access to bank loans by private enterprises in China}, author = {Z Tao and J Lu and C Bai}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85925}, year = {2005}, date = {2005-01-01}, journal = {China Economic Quarterly}, abstract = {本文利用对我国私营企业的调查数据研究影响私营企业获得银行贷款难易程度的因素。我们发现,私营企业在财产权受到侵蚀和面临政策歧视的情况下获得银行贷款比较困难,此外,私营企业主对私有财产权的自我保护有助于私营企业获得银行贷款。我们还发现,在借贷双方的信息不对称和借款方道德风险问题得到较好解决的情况下,私营企业比较容易得到贷款。}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } 本文利用对我国私营企业的调查数据研究影响私营企业获得银行贷款难易程度的因素。我们发现,私营企业在财产权受到侵蚀和面临政策歧视的情况下获得银行贷款比较困难,此外,私营企业主对私有财产权的自我保护有助于私营企业获得银行贷款。我们还发现,在借贷双方的信息不对称和借款方道德风险问题得到较好解决的情况下,私营企业比较容易得到贷款。 |
2001 |
Zhu, T; Tao, Z An agency theory of transactions without contract enforcement: The case of China Journal Article China Economic Review, 2001, ISSN: 1043-951X. @article{HKUHUB_10722_85844, title = {An agency theory of transactions without contract enforcement: The case of China}, author = {T Zhu and Z Tao}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85844}, doi = {10.1016/S1043-951X(01)00040-2}, issn = {1043-951X}, year = {2001}, date = {2001-01-01}, journal = {China Economic Review}, abstract = {This paper offers a theory to explain in the Chinese context how interfirm transactions can be effectively carried out in the absence of a sound contract enforcement system. Noting that the development of China's nonstate sector, the primary contributor to its rapid economic growth, has relied heavily on its transactional relationships with the state sector, we develop an agency theory of interfirm transactions based on the following idea: a state enterprise manager, being an agent, may acquire private benefits in exchange for not holding up a nonstate trading partner; and this, in turn, improves the latter's incentive for transaction-specific investments. © 2001 Elsevier Science Inc.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This paper offers a theory to explain in the Chinese context how interfirm transactions can be effectively carried out in the absence of a sound contract enforcement system. Noting that the development of China's nonstate sector, the primary contributor to its rapid economic growth, has relied heavily on its transactional relationships with the state sector, we develop an agency theory of interfirm transactions based on the following idea: a state enterprise manager, being an agent, may acquire private benefits in exchange for not holding up a nonstate trading partner; and this, in turn, improves the latter's incentive for transaction-specific investments. © 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. |
Tao, Z; Wong, RYC An Economic Study of Hong Kong's Manufacturing-Related Producer Services Industry Conference 2001. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_112206, title = {An Economic Study of Hong Kong's Manufacturing-Related Producer Services Industry}, author = {Z Tao and RYC Wong}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/112206}, year = {2001}, date = {2001-01-01}, journal = {Annual Meeting of the Chinese Economists Society}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
Tao, Z; Wong, RYC An Economic Study of Hong Kong's Manufacturing-Related Producer Services Industry Conference 2001. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_112206b, title = {An Economic Study of Hong Kong's Manufacturing-Related Producer Services Industry}, author = {Z Tao and RYC Wong}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/112206}, year = {2001}, date = {2001-01-01}, journal = {Annual Meeting of the Chinese Economists Society}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
2000 |
Suen, W A competitive theory of equilibrium and disequilibrium unravelling in two-sided matching Journal Article RAND Journal of Economics, 2000, ISSN: 0741-6261. @article{HKUHUB_10722_85609, title = {A competitive theory of equilibrium and disequilibrium unravelling in two-sided matching}, author = {W Suen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85609}, issn = {0741-6261}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, journal = {RAND Journal of Economics}, abstract = {I offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets. The explanation does not rely on market power, strategic motives, or instability of the assignment mechanism. Uncertainty about workers' ability will produce inefficient matching if contracts are formed early. However, the insurance gain from early contracting may outweigh the loss from inefficient matching. If firms are risk neutral, it is the mediocre firms that will have the greatest incentive to offer early contracts. Opening up a market for early contracting will generally benefit the firms and hurt the workers. If firms are sufficiently risk averse, even the lowest-quality firms may want to offer early contracts, and a competitive equilibrium may not exist.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } I offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets. The explanation does not rely on market power, strategic motives, or instability of the assignment mechanism. Uncertainty about workers' ability will produce inefficient matching if contracts are formed early. However, the insurance gain from early contracting may outweigh the loss from inefficient matching. If firms are risk neutral, it is the mediocre firms that will have the greatest incentive to offer early contracts. Opening up a market for early contracting will generally benefit the firms and hurt the workers. If firms are sufficiently risk averse, even the lowest-quality firms may want to offer early contracts, and a competitive equilibrium may not exist. |
Suen, W A competitive theory of equilibrium and disequilibrium unravelling in two-sided matching Journal Article RAND Journal of Economics, 2000, ISSN: 0741-6261. @article{HKUHUB_10722_85609b, title = {A competitive theory of equilibrium and disequilibrium unravelling in two-sided matching}, author = {W Suen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85609}, issn = {0741-6261}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, journal = {RAND Journal of Economics}, abstract = {I offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets. The explanation does not rely on market power, strategic motives, or instability of the assignment mechanism. Uncertainty about workers' ability will produce inefficient matching if contracts are formed early. However, the insurance gain from early contracting may outweigh the loss from inefficient matching. If firms are risk neutral, it is the mediocre firms that will have the greatest incentive to offer early contracts. Opening up a market for early contracting will generally benefit the firms and hurt the workers. If firms are sufficiently risk averse, even the lowest-quality firms may want to offer early contracts, and a competitive equilibrium may not exist.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } I offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets. The explanation does not rely on market power, strategic motives, or instability of the assignment mechanism. Uncertainty about workers' ability will produce inefficient matching if contracts are formed early. However, the insurance gain from early contracting may outweigh the loss from inefficient matching. If firms are risk neutral, it is the mediocre firms that will have the greatest incentive to offer early contracts. Opening up a market for early contracting will generally benefit the firms and hurt the workers. If firms are sufficiently risk averse, even the lowest-quality firms may want to offer early contracts, and a competitive equilibrium may not exist. |
Tao, Z; Bai, CE; Li, DD; Wang, Y A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform Journal Article Journal of Comparative Economics, 2000, ISSN: 0147-5967. @article{HKUHUB_10722_86021, title = {A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform}, author = {Z Tao and CE Bai and DD Li and Y Wang}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/86021}, doi = {10.1006/jcec.2000.1681}, issn = {0147-5967}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, journal = {Journal of Comparative Economics}, abstract = {During transition, maintaining employment and providing a social safety net to the unemployed are important to social stability, which in turn is crucial for the productivity of the whole economy. Because independent institutions for social safety are lacking and firms with strong profit incentives have little incentive to promote social stability due to its public good nature, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are needed to continue their role in providing social welfare. Charged with the multitasks of efficient production as well as social welfare provision, SOEs continue to be given low profit incentives, and consequently their financial performance continues to be poor.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 716-738. The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, and WDI; Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, CEPR, and WDI; The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455, CEPR, and WDI. © 2000 Academic Press.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } During transition, maintaining employment and providing a social safety net to the unemployed are important to social stability, which in turn is crucial for the productivity of the whole economy. Because independent institutions for social safety are lacking and firms with strong profit incentives have little incentive to promote social stability due to its public good nature, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are needed to continue their role in providing social welfare. Charged with the multitasks of efficient production as well as social welfare provision, SOEs continue to be given low profit incentives, and consequently their financial performance continues to be poor.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 716-738. The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, and WDI; Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, CEPR, and WDI; The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455, CEPR, and WDI. © 2000 Academic Press. |
Wang, Y; Tao, Z; Li, D; Bai, C A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform Conference 2000. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_112165, title = {A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform}, author = {Y Wang and Z Tao and D Li and C Bai}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/112165}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, journal = {Hong Kong Economic Association Meeting}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
Tao, Z; Zhu, T Agency and Self-Enforcing Contracts Journal Article Journal of Comparative Economics, 2000, ISSN: 0147-5967. @article{HKUHUB_10722_85986, title = {Agency and Self-Enforcing Contracts}, author = {Z Tao and T Zhu}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85986}, doi = {10.1006/jcec.2000.1630}, issn = {0147-5967}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, journal = {Journal of Comparative Economics}, abstract = {This paper studies the role of agency in the self-enforcement of interfirm contracts. When interfirm transactions are carried out by the agents rather than the owners, the agents' incentive to breach a contract for the benefit of their firm is typically lower than that of the owners if doing so entails a personal cost or a loss of private benefits. Thus agency has a commitment value in making contracts self-enforcing. The cost of agency is the typical moral hazard problem. Implications are drawn for transition economies in which formal institutions for contract enforcement are weak.J. Comp. Econom., March 2000, 28(1), pp. 80-94. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, China; Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong, China. © 2000 Academic Press.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This paper studies the role of agency in the self-enforcement of interfirm contracts. When interfirm transactions are carried out by the agents rather than the owners, the agents' incentive to breach a contract for the benefit of their firm is typically lower than that of the owners if doing so entails a personal cost or a loss of private benefits. Thus agency has a commitment value in making contracts self-enforcing. The cost of agency is the typical moral hazard problem. Implications are drawn for transition economies in which formal institutions for contract enforcement are weak.J. Comp. Econom., March 2000, 28(1), pp. 80-94. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, China; Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong, China. © 2000 Academic Press. |
Tao, Z; Wong, RYC; Chan, CS An Economic Study of Hong Kong's Producer Service Sector and Its Role in Supporting Manufacturing Book 2000. @book{HKUHUB_10722_121249, title = {An Economic Study of Hong Kong's Producer Service Sector and Its Role in Supporting Manufacturing}, author = {Z Tao and RYC Wong and CS Chan}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/121249}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {book} } |
Tao, Z; Wong, RYC; Chan, CS An Economic Study of Hong Kong's Producer Service Sector and Its Role in Supporting Manufacturing Book 2000. @book{HKUHUB_10722_121249b, title = {An Economic Study of Hong Kong's Producer Service Sector and Its Role in Supporting Manufacturing}, author = {Z Tao and RYC Wong and CS Chan}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/121249}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {book} } |
Chan, W; Suen, W An evaluation of the Hong Kong employees retraining programme Journal Article Asian Economic Journal, 2000, ISSN: 1351-3958. @article{HKUHUB_10722_85648, title = {An evaluation of the Hong Kong employees retraining programme}, author = {W Chan and W Suen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85648}, doi = {10.1111/1467-8381.00111}, issn = {1351-3958}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, journal = {Asian Economic Journal}, abstract = {The Employees Retraining Programme, launched by the Hong Kong government in 1993, was promoted as the solution to structural unemployment resulting from rapid structural transformation of the economy. However, our study of the labour market performance of a group of trainees who received training in 1994/5 shows no evidence of any positive effect on the earnings or employment rate of trainees one year after the completion of training in relation to various comparison groups. The apparent lack of success can be traced to low target efficiency and distorted incentives that result in over-utilization of retraining resources.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The Employees Retraining Programme, launched by the Hong Kong government in 1993, was promoted as the solution to structural unemployment resulting from rapid structural transformation of the economy. However, our study of the labour market performance of a group of trainees who received training in 1994/5 shows no evidence of any positive effect on the earnings or employment rate of trainees one year after the completion of training in relation to various comparison groups. The apparent lack of success can be traced to low target efficiency and distorted incentives that result in over-utilization of retraining resources. |
Chan, W; Suen, W An evaluation of the Hong Kong employees retraining programme Journal Article Asian Economic Journal, 2000, ISSN: 1351-3958. @article{HKUHUB_10722_85648b, title = {An evaluation of the Hong Kong employees retraining programme}, author = {W Chan and W Suen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85648}, doi = {10.1111/1467-8381.00111}, issn = {1351-3958}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, journal = {Asian Economic Journal}, abstract = {The Employees Retraining Programme, launched by the Hong Kong government in 1993, was promoted as the solution to structural unemployment resulting from rapid structural transformation of the economy. However, our study of the labour market performance of a group of trainees who received training in 1994/5 shows no evidence of any positive effect on the earnings or employment rate of trainees one year after the completion of training in relation to various comparison groups. The apparent lack of success can be traced to low target efficiency and distorted incentives that result in over-utilization of retraining resources.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The Employees Retraining Programme, launched by the Hong Kong government in 1993, was promoted as the solution to structural unemployment resulting from rapid structural transformation of the economy. However, our study of the labour market performance of a group of trainees who received training in 1994/5 shows no evidence of any positive effect on the earnings or employment rate of trainees one year after the completion of training in relation to various comparison groups. The apparent lack of success can be traced to low target efficiency and distorted incentives that result in over-utilization of retraining resources. |
Tso, PS; Wong, RYC; Chang, EC; Siu, AKF; Luk, YF; Kwan, WC Asian Financial Crisis: Causes and Development Book 2000. @book{HKUHUB_10722_121897, title = {Asian Financial Crisis: Causes and Development}, author = {PS Tso and RYC Wong and EC Chang and AKF Siu and YF Luk and WC Kwan}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/121897}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {book} } |
Tao, Z; Dasgupta, S Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership Journal Article International Economic Review, 2000, ISSN: 0020-6598. @article{HKUHUB_10722_85770, title = {Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership}, author = {Z Tao and S Dasgupta}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85770}, doi = {10.1111/1468-2354.00078}, issn = {0020-6598}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, journal = {International Economic Review}, abstract = {This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of investment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can use or general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When the benefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity participation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take-or-pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the downstream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of investment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can use or general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When the benefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity participation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take-or-pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the downstream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power. |
Tao, Z; Bai, C Breach Remedies and Hold Up With Breach Inducement Conference 2000. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_112182, title = {Breach Remedies and Hold Up With Breach Inducement}, author = {Z Tao and C Bai}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/112182}, year = {2000}, date = {2000-01-01}, journal = {Hong Kong Economic Association Meeting}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
1999 |
Suen, W; Lui, HK A direct test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis Journal Article Economic Inquiry, 1999, ISSN: 0095-2583. @article{HKUHUB_10722_48704, title = {A direct test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis}, author = {W Suen and HK Lui}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/48704}, doi = {10.1111/j.1465-7295.1999.tb01414.x}, issn = {0095-2583}, year = {1999}, date = {1999-01-01}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, abstract = {This paper takes Becker 's efficient marriage market hypothesis at face value, and directly confronts it with data from Hong Kong. The theory of optimal assignment is used to develop an empirical model of spouse selection, which resembles a Tobit model. This model can address positive or negative assortative matching as well as marginal product pricing in marriage markets. We also use a computer algorithm to solve the assignment problem for imputed marital output. The degree to which the actual pairing of husbands and wives corresponds to the optimal pairing provides a goodness-of-fit test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis. (JEL, C51, C61, C78, J12).}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This paper takes Becker 's efficient marriage market hypothesis at face value, and directly confronts it with data from Hong Kong. The theory of optimal assignment is used to develop an empirical model of spouse selection, which resembles a Tobit model. This model can address positive or negative assortative matching as well as marginal product pricing in marriage markets. We also use a computer algorithm to solve the assignment problem for imputed marital output. The degree to which the actual pairing of husbands and wives corresponds to the optimal pairing provides a goodness-of-fit test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis. (JEL, C51, C61, C78, J12). |
Suen, W; Lui, HK A direct test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis Journal Article Economic Inquiry, 1999, ISSN: 0095-2583. @article{HKUHUB_10722_48704b, title = {A direct test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis}, author = {W Suen and HK Lui}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/48704}, doi = {10.1111/j.1465-7295.1999.tb01414.x}, issn = {0095-2583}, year = {1999}, date = {1999-01-01}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, abstract = {This paper takes Becker 's efficient marriage market hypothesis at face value, and directly confronts it with data from Hong Kong. The theory of optimal assignment is used to develop an empirical model of spouse selection, which resembles a Tobit model. This model can address positive or negative assortative matching as well as marginal product pricing in marriage markets. We also use a computer algorithm to solve the assignment problem for imputed marital output. The degree to which the actual pairing of husbands and wives corresponds to the optimal pairing provides a goodness-of-fit test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis. (JEL, C51, C61, C78, J12).}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This paper takes Becker 's efficient marriage market hypothesis at face value, and directly confronts it with data from Hong Kong. The theory of optimal assignment is used to develop an empirical model of spouse selection, which resembles a Tobit model. This model can address positive or negative assortative matching as well as marginal product pricing in marriage markets. We also use a computer algorithm to solve the assignment problem for imputed marital output. The degree to which the actual pairing of husbands and wives corresponds to the optimal pairing provides a goodness-of-fit test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis. (JEL, C51, C61, C78, J12). |
Kao, CK; Wang, G; Wong, RYC; Young, L; Cham, TS; Wong, PK A Window of Opportunity Opens for Singapore and Hong Kong Book Chapter 1999. @inbook{HKUHUB_10722_121288, title = {A Window of Opportunity Opens for Singapore and Hong Kong}, author = {CK Kao and G Wang and RYC Wong and L Young and TS Cham and PK Wong}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/121288}, year = {1999}, date = {1999-01-01}, journal = {Study Report}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } |
Wong, RYC Analysis of Hong Kong's Current Position as Compared to Singapore Conference 1999. @conference{HKUHUB_10722_112177, title = {Analysis of Hong Kong's Current Position as Compared to Singapore}, author = {RYC Wong}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/112177}, year = {1999}, date = {1999-01-01}, journal = {Zonta Club lunch, 16 September 1999}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
Wong, RYC Borderline Case of Symbiotic Survival Book Chapter 1999. @inbook{HKUHUB_10722_121292, title = {Borderline Case of Symbiotic Survival}, author = {RYC Wong}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/121292}, year = {1999}, date = {1999-01-01}, journal = {China Business Review Interview}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } |
1997 |
Bakshi, Gurdip S; Chen, Zhiwu An alternative valuation model for contingent claims Journal Article Journal of Financial Economics, 1997, ISSN: 0304-405X. @article{HKUHUB_10722_212682, title = {An alternative valuation model for contingent claims}, author = {Gurdip S Bakshi and Zhiwu Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/212682}, issn = {0304-405X}, year = {1997}, date = {1997-01-01}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economics}, abstract = {This paper studies contingent claim valuation in a Lucas-type exchange economy. The derived fundamental valuation equation differs from its Cox-Ingersoll-Ross production-economy counterpart in that it is expressed in terms of the direct utility function and an exogenous output process, thus offering superior tractability. We apply our approach to derive closed-form solutions for bond, bond option, individual stock, and stock option prices, under a more general setting than allowable in the Cox Ingersoll-Ross framework. The resulting interest rate and stock price dynamics are empirically plausible. Moreover, our stock option pricing formula with stochastic volatility and interest rates can reconcile certain puzzling empirical regularities, including the volatility smile.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This paper studies contingent claim valuation in a Lucas-type exchange economy. The derived fundamental valuation equation differs from its Cox-Ingersoll-Ross production-economy counterpart in that it is expressed in terms of the direct utility function and an exogenous output process, thus offering superior tractability. We apply our approach to derive closed-form solutions for bond, bond option, individual stock, and stock option prices, under a more general setting than allowable in the Cox Ingersoll-Ross framework. The resulting interest rate and stock price dynamics are empirically plausible. Moreover, our stock option pricing formula with stochastic volatility and interest rates can reconcile certain puzzling empirical regularities, including the volatility smile. |
Anderson, CL; Swimmer, G; Suen, W An empirical analysis of viewer demand for U.S. programming and the effect of Canadian broadcasting regulations Journal Article Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1997, ISSN: 0276-8739. @article{HKUHUB_10722_85630, title = {An empirical analysis of viewer demand for U.S. programming and the effect of Canadian broadcasting regulations}, author = {CL Anderson and G Swimmer and W Suen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85630}, doi = {10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199723)16:4<525::AID-PAM1>3.0.CO;2-I}, issn = {0276-8739}, year = {1997}, date = {1997-01-01}, journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management}, abstract = {Using viewer share and rating points for the Toronto/Hamilton television market, we estimate the demand for U.S. programs retransmitted in Canada and test several hypotheses on the effect of domestic content regulation, program type, simulcasting regulations, network affiliation, and other broadcasting variables on audience size. These estimates have general implications for the current trade debate over the cultural industries. More specifically, our results provide support for some U.S. rights holders arguing for greater compensation for the retransmission of programs in Canada, and they raise questions about the publicly stated rationale of domestic content quotas generating net social benefits. Tliese results can generalize to the many European Union and English-speaking countries using similar domestic content quotas.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Using viewer share and rating points for the Toronto/Hamilton television market, we estimate the demand for U.S. programs retransmitted in Canada and test several hypotheses on the effect of domestic content regulation, program type, simulcasting regulations, network affiliation, and other broadcasting variables on audience size. These estimates have general implications for the current trade debate over the cultural industries. More specifically, our results provide support for some U.S. rights holders arguing for greater compensation for the retransmission of programs in Canada, and they raise questions about the publicly stated rationale of domestic content quotas generating net social benefits. Tliese results can generalize to the many European Union and English-speaking countries using similar domestic content quotas. |
Anderson, CL; Swimmer, G; Suen, W An empirical analysis of viewer demand for U.S. programming and the effect of Canadian broadcasting regulations Journal Article Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1997, ISSN: 0276-8739. @article{HKUHUB_10722_85630b, title = {An empirical analysis of viewer demand for U.S. programming and the effect of Canadian broadcasting regulations}, author = {CL Anderson and G Swimmer and W Suen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85630}, doi = {10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199723)16:4<525::AID-PAM1>3.0.CO;2-I}, issn = {0276-8739}, year = {1997}, date = {1997-01-01}, journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management}, abstract = {Using viewer share and rating points for the Toronto/Hamilton television market, we estimate the demand for U.S. programs retransmitted in Canada and test several hypotheses on the effect of domestic content regulation, program type, simulcasting regulations, network affiliation, and other broadcasting variables on audience size. These estimates have general implications for the current trade debate over the cultural industries. More specifically, our results provide support for some U.S. rights holders arguing for greater compensation for the retransmission of programs in Canada, and they raise questions about the publicly stated rationale of domestic content quotas generating net social benefits. Tliese results can generalize to the many European Union and English-speaking countries using similar domestic content quotas.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Using viewer share and rating points for the Toronto/Hamilton television market, we estimate the demand for U.S. programs retransmitted in Canada and test several hypotheses on the effect of domestic content regulation, program type, simulcasting regulations, network affiliation, and other broadcasting variables on audience size. These estimates have general implications for the current trade debate over the cultural industries. More specifically, our results provide support for some U.S. rights holders arguing for greater compensation for the retransmission of programs in Canada, and they raise questions about the publicly stated rationale of domestic content quotas generating net social benefits. Tliese results can generalize to the many European Union and English-speaking countries using similar domestic content quotas. |
1995 |
Wong, RYC An economic analysis of the crime rate in England and Wales, 1857-92 Journal Article Economica, 1995, ISSN: 0013-0427. @article{HKUHUB_10722_85517, title = {An economic analysis of the crime rate in England and Wales, 1857-92}, author = {RYC Wong}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85517}, doi = {10.2307/2554905}, issn = {0013-0427}, year = {1995}, date = {1995-01-01}, journal = {Economica}, abstract = {This is an economic analysis of the determinants of the crime rate in England and Wales during 1857-92. In this period the overall crime rate first rose and subsequently fell. Various analysts have interpreted this to imply that criminal behaviour in this period cannot be explained by economic incentives. The study finds that the overall crime rate responded to incentives for pursuing legal and illegal activities. Growing economic prosperity and rising educational standards contributed to the overall decline in the crime rate during the second half of the 19th century. Cyclical economic fluctuations as proxied by the unemployment rate were also a significant determinant of the crime rate. -Author}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This is an economic analysis of the determinants of the crime rate in England and Wales during 1857-92. In this period the overall crime rate first rose and subsequently fell. Various analysts have interpreted this to imply that criminal behaviour in this period cannot be explained by economic incentives. The study finds that the overall crime rate responded to incentives for pursuing legal and illegal activities. Growing economic prosperity and rising educational standards contributed to the overall decline in the crime rate during the second half of the 19th century. Cyclical economic fluctuations as proxied by the unemployment rate were also a significant determinant of the crime rate. -Author |
1994 |
Chen, Z; Knez, PJ A Pricing Operator-Based Testing Foundation for a Class of Factor Pricing Models Journal Article Mathematical Finance, 1994, ISSN: 0960-1627. @article{HKUHUB_10722_222294, title = {A Pricing Operator-Based Testing Foundation for a Class of Factor Pricing Models}, author = {Z Chen and PJ Knez}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/222294}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9965.1994.tb00053.x}, issn = {0960-1627}, year = {1994}, date = {1994-01-01}, journal = {Mathematical Finance}, abstract = {This paper develops a cross-market version of factor pricing models. It is shown that exact factor pricing holds across two submarkets with respect to their common factors if and only if the unique pricing operator for the first submarket is equal to that for the other submarket with probability 1. We define an APT measure as the squared distance between the two pricing operators. Then, testing whether this measure is zero is equivalent to testing exact factor pricing across the two submarkets. Since the estimation of this measure does not require parameterizing and extracting the underlying factors, one can test factor pricing models without knowing any factors. In addition, we present a randomization procedure so that one can use it to conduct a more comprehensive investigation on the empirical robustness of factor pricing models.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This paper develops a cross-market version of factor pricing models. It is shown that exact factor pricing holds across two submarkets with respect to their common factors if and only if the unique pricing operator for the first submarket is equal to that for the other submarket with probability 1. We define an APT measure as the squared distance between the two pricing operators. Then, testing whether this measure is zero is equivalent to testing exact factor pricing across the two submarkets. Since the estimation of this measure does not require parameterizing and extracting the underlying factors, one can test factor pricing models without knowing any factors. In addition, we present a randomization procedure so that one can use it to conduct a more comprehensive investigation on the empirical robustness of factor pricing models. |
Bakshi, G; Chen, Z Baby Boom, Population Aging, and Capital Markets Journal Article The Journal of Business (Chicago), 1994, ISSN: 0021-9398. @article{HKUHUB_10722_222293, title = {Baby Boom, Population Aging, and Capital Markets}, author = {G Bakshi and Z Chen}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10722/222293}, issn = {0021-9398}, year = {1994}, date = {1994-01-01}, journal = {The Journal of Business (Chicago)}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } |